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INTRODUCTION
Influential theories of concept-identification hehavior are based on the notion that
subjects test hypotheses to identify concepts (e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin,
1956; Levine, 1975). According to this thesis, subjects select hypotheses and
classify instances (stimuli) according to the selected hypotheses. If the classifica-
fioD tums out to he incorrect, subjects reject their hypothesis and choose another
ODe. If, on the contrary, the classification tums out to be correct, the subjects do
not change their hypothesis. In the majority of experiments subjects performed in
accordance with the above-mentioned strategy: "reject hypothesis only af ter dis-
confirmation" (e.g., Coltheart, 1973; De Swart & Das-Smaal, 1976, 1979;
Falmagne, 1970; White, 1974).
Bayes' theorem provides a mathematical model to account for changes in
confidence that accompany hypothesis-testing (e.g., De Swart, 1971; Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1972). In a (deterministic) concept-identification task the theorem
predicts that the more frequently a hypothesis is confirmed, the more confident a
subject is that his selected hypothesis is correct. However, if the selected
hypothesis is disconfirmed, the subject is certain that the selected hypothesis is
wrong. Several studies present data that are in agreement with the Bayesian
prediction (De Swart & Das-Smaal, 1976, 1979; Falmagne, 1970; Trabasso &
Bower, 1968).
SokoIov's (1969) model of the orienting reflex (OR) provides an analogue at
the neural level of the cognitive process of testing hypotheses. In Sokoiov's
model it is assumed that the nervous system registers neural modeis, which
represent a system of hypotheses. Sokolov used also Bayes' theorem to evaluate
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the quantitative change in the probabilities of the hypotheses resulting from
information from the outside world (i.e., confirmative and disconfirmative
feedback). These changes in probabilities are thought to be revealed by
autonomic activity.
In several studies- differences in information-processing activities during a
concept-identification task were found to be accompanied by changes in the skin
conductance response (SCR) (De Swart & Das-Smaal, 1976, 1979; Pishkin &
Shurley, 1968; Pishkin & Wolfgang, 1964; Zimmermann, 1971). De Swart &
Das-Smaal (1976, 1979) argued that these differences in SCR could be attributed
primarily to changes in confidence in the hypothesis under test and concluded that
SokoIov's model of the OR was supported.
The present study aimed to test more directly the hypothesis that changes in
confidence in the selected hypothesis are reflected in the change in autonomic
activity, measured by SCR.
According to Bayes' theorem the probability that the selected hypothesis is
true, given a confirmation-p(T/C)-is a function of (a) the probability that the
selected hypothesis is either true or false-p(T) and p(F), respectively; (b) the
probability that, given the hypothesis is true, the classification is confirmed-
p(C/T); (c) the probability that, given that the hypothesis is false, the classification
will be confirmed-p(C/F). In a deterministic concept-iearning task the following
relationships hold: (a) pCT) + p(F) = land (b) p(C/T) = I. Hence,
The change in probability af ter a confirmation that the selected hypothesis is
correct equals p(T/C) -p(T). Af ter a disconfirmation the probability that the
selected hypothesis is true reduces to zero; hence the change in probability isp(T).
In the present study the subject had to estimate the certainty that bis classifica-
tion was true. This estimate was taken as an index for p(T).
It was predicted that: (a) When confirming feedback follows a classification,
t~e SCR will be smaller than when disconfirming feedback follows the classifica-
tion; this prediction holds in concept-identification tasks where p(C/F) > 0.50,
which is actually true in almost all detenninistic concept-leaming tasks. SCR
af ter noninformative feedback will be the smallest one. (b) When confirming
feedback follows a classification, the SCR will be larger when the subject was
uncertain (about bis classification) than when the subject was relatively certain.
(c) When disconfirming feedback follows a classification, the SCR will be
smaller when the subject was uncertain than when he was relatively certain.
(d) When noninformative feedback follows a classification, the SCR will not
differ as a function of degree of certainty.
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EXPERIMENT
Method
Subjects. There were 16 male subjects who volunteered. They were pre-
screened for color blindness and participated for a Hfl. IO,-payment (about
$4.00).
Stimuli. The stimuli were composed of four three-valued dimensions: figure
(triangle, quadrangle, pentagon), letter (alpha, hela, pi), color (blue, brown,
green; presented in the form of a rectangle), and arabic numeral (7, 8, 9). For
each dimensional value three variations were used (e.g., a light, medium, and
dart blue). Those selected were found to be the lowest in exemplariness among
six variations pretested (Das-Smaal & De Swart, 1979). This was dolle to ensure
that the tast was difficuIt enough to provide enough trials for analysis. The
stimulus material was presented on slides. Each slide was divided into four
quadrants. Each variant was randomly assigned to one of the quadrants. The
feedback was presented by slides: No information was designated by "un-
known" and belonging in the positive and negative category by "positive" and
"negative," respectively. Four different conjunctive concepts were employed;
each subject was presented with only one concept. A maximum of 40 stimuli
were presented. The composition and the order of the presentation of the 40
stimuli were determined at random with the following restrictions: (a) On the
average two values per trial had to change, varying from one to three values at a
average two values per trial had to change, varying from one to three values at a
time; (b) all three variants had to be used equally of ten; (c) 50% of the stimuli had
to be instances of the concept; (d) "unknown", "positive," and "negative" had
to appear equally of ten; (e) for an optimal information-processing slibject the
third trial had to reduce the number of possible hypotheses to one.
Apparatus. Tbe experimental room was dimly illuminated and soundproof. A
projector (Carousel Model Type 2) was located outside the room. Stimuli and
feedback slides were projected on a frosted-glass window in front of the subject.
Tbe subject had to classify each instance as a member of the class (positive
response) or not (negative response). Subjects responded by pressing one of two
buttons, a positiveor a negative one. In addition to the buttons there was a lever
to indicate the uncertainty of the categorization (CE). The buttons and the lever
were fastened to the armrest of the subject's chair within reach of his preferred
hand. Both responses were registered automatically with the aid of a Beckman
8-channel polygraph (type R 411 dynograph). Timer impulses to the projector
and the SCR were also recorded on this polygraph. Basic level SCR was
measured DC and specific SCR's were measured AC by a constant O.5-V voltage
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bridge. AC responses were registered with a time constant of 3-sec. Ag/AgCl
electrodes, 7.5 mm in diameter, were attached to the volar surfaée of the distal
phalanx of the second and third finger of the subject's nonpreferred hand.
Agar-agar paste with a 0.067 m KCl solution was used.
Procedure. Af ter infonning the subject about the experiment, the recording
leads were attached and the subject was seated in the soundproof room. The
subject was given instructions as to the nature of the task, the responses required,
and as to the meaning of the certainty estimate and the feedback. The subjects
were told (a) that a conjunction had to be learned; (b) that two types of feedback
would be given, with infonnation ("positive" or "negative") and without
infonnation ("unknown"). It was explained that the Iatter type of feedback
contained no infonnation about the correctness of the subject's response. It was
stressed that the actual position of the values was irrelevant to the solution.
Classification of some kind of fruit was given to exemplify the variations within
values. A training task was given, followed by 5 min rest, and the experimental
task began.
The trials of the experimental tasks were composed as follows: stimulus
presentation (12 sec), af ter which the subject had to give his categorization
response (positive or negative; CE) immediately; 7 sec af ter the stimulus offset,
feedback ("positive," "negative," or "unknown") was shown during 5 sec.
Af ter a 3-sec rest interval, the next stimulus was shown. The task was tenninated
af ter 10 successive correct classifications or af ter 40 trials if this criterion was not
met.
Quantification of data. SCR was measured as the greatest conductance change
(I1.SC), beg inning between land 4 sec af ter onset of the feedback. To reduce
individual differences in SCR activity 1he change in log conductance (~ log C)
was calculated and taken as a measure for the SCR. Within each type of feedback
SCR was categorized according to whether the subject was uncertain or certain
(CE ~ 0.50 or CE ~ 0.50, respectively). This was done for all SCR's for each
subject ti" he met criterion. In case of empty categories the subject was omitted
from the analysis.
A consequence of the number of noninformative feedback trials was that
subjects received a maximum of 27 trials from which they could leam instead of a
maximum of 40 trials as indicated by the criterion. Hence, number of trials to
criterion (TLE) and number of errors (NE) were based on 27 trials at most,
excluding the noninformative trials.
Results
Only 9 of the 16 subjects produced enough SCR scores to cast in a two-way
manneraccording to type of feedback and CE s 0.50 andCE ~ 0.50. Table 3\.\
summarizes foT this group of subjects the means foT each dependent variabie.
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TABLE 31.1
Number of Trials (N) and Mean SCR Values (100 lliog C) for
Each Type of Feedback as a Function of




















The meao number of trials to reach criterion and the mean number of errors
were 20.33 (CT = 6.67) and 8.11 (CT = 4.28), respectively. The number of trials
and number of errors were significantly correlated (rs = 0.79, p < 0.01). The
different concepts did not result in a significant difference in number of trials
to reach criterion and number of errors (Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of
variance; H = 2.01 and H = 0.96, respectively; p > 0.10). Therefore the data
were not further analyzed with respect o this variabie.
CE and GSR were not significantly correlated (rs = 0.28, p > 0.10).
The meao SCR values within each category are shown in Table 31. I. No
significant difference in meao SCR values tumed up between noninformative and
confirming feedback (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-ranks test; z = 1.08, p =
0.13, one-tailed). However, both types of feedback differed significantly from
disconfirming feedback (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-ranks test; Z = 2.19 and
2.43, p = 0.014 and 0.008, one-tailed, for the differences disconfirming-
confirming feedback and disconfirming-noninformative feedback, respectively).
Within the noninformative type of feedback no significant SCR difference
between CE ~ 0.50 and CE 2: 0.50 tumed up (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-
ranks test; z = 0.41, P = 0.68). A significant difference in SCR tumed up within
the confirming and disconfirming types of feedback between CE ~ 0.50 and
CE > 0.50 (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-ranks test; z = 1.95, p = 0.026,
one-tailed for both differences). The direction of the differences was, however,
different for the two types of feedback. Af ter confirming feedback SCR was
larger when the subject was uncertain than when he was certain; af ter discon-
firming feedback SCR showed the opposite tendency.
The effect of habituation was analyzed by Vincentizing to correct for the
difference in number of trials between subjects. No significant effect tumed up
(Friedman two-way analysis of variance; X2 = 2.72, 0.278 < p < 0.328).
To test the hypothesis that the relative frequency of the different types of
feedback influenced the magnitude of SCR, the SCR data of each subject were
cast to ODe of three categories of relative frequency: "Iow," "medium," and
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"high." The analysis showed a nonsignificant difference between "Iow" and
"high" as weil as between the categories "medium" and "high." (Wilcoxon
matched pairs signed-ranks test; z = 1.40, P > 0.081; and z = 0.56, p = 0.288,
both one-tailed, respectively). Only the difference between the low- and medium-
frequency category was significant (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-ranks test;
Z = 2.24, p = 0.013, one-tailed).
DISCUSSION
SCR values resulting from the different types of feedback were ordered as
predicted-that is, noninformative feedback resulted in the smallest SCR value,
whereas confirming feedback caused smaller SCR values than disconfirming
feedback, as found by De Swart & Das-Smaal (1976, 1979). However, the
predicted differences between noninformative and confirming feedback were not
significant. The differences between confirming and disconfirming as weil as
between noninformative and disconfirming feedback were in accordance with the
predictions. Furthermore, the data showed the predicted relationship between
subjects' certainty about their classification and their SCR va1ues for each type of
feedback. When the subject was relatively uncertain about bis classification,
confirming feedback resulted in larger SCR values than when he was relative1y
certain about bis classification. The opposite tendency was found af ter discon-
firming feedback; larger SCR values were found when the subject was relatively
certain about bis classification than when he was relatively uncertain. Af ter
noninformative feedback the SCR values were not influenced by the certainty of
the subject in bis classification.
These results were in agreement with the hypothesis that SokoIov's (1969)
model of the orienti1"!g reflex provides an analogue at the neural level of the
cognitive process of testing hypotheses. The Bayesian prediction with respect o
the order of quantitative change in the probability of the hypothesis onder test,
resulting from the different types of feedback, showed up in the SCR data.
The findings were also in agreement with De Swart's & Das-Smaal's (1976,
1979) suggestion that in a concept-identification task SCR indicates primari1y
uncertainty reduction. They found SCR differences between conceptual mIes
when there was uncertainty about the mIes, differing in prior probabilities.
However, these differences in SCR vanished when the uncertainty about he mIes
was removed (De Swart & Das Smaal, 1979).
It seemed warranted to conclude that the findings could not be explained by
habituation. The lack of a habituation effect during the learning process canceled
out a simple habituation explanation. However, it could be argued (a) that in the
beginning of the learning task subjects are less certain about their hypotheses than
at the end of the task; (b) that in the beg inning of the task the probability that the
hypothesis is disconfirmed is larger than at the end of the task; (c) that the number
of confirmations was larger than the number of disconfirmations. This argument
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leads to the following predictions: (a) SCR af ter noninformative feedback had to
be smaller when the subject was relatively uncertain about bis hypothesis than
when he was relatively certain; (b) SCR af ter confirmative feedback had to be
larger when the subject was relatively uncertain about bis hypothesis than when
he was relatively certain; (c) SCR af ter disconfirmative feedback had to be larger
when the subject was relatively uncertain about bis hypothesis than when he was
relatively certain; (d) SCR af ter confirmation had to be smaller than af ter
disconfirmation. Only the second and fourth predictions were supported in the
data. However, the fourth prediction was falsified by the analysis of the SCR data
according to the relative frequency of each type of feedback; the predicted order
of SCR values according to the "relative frequency" hypothesis was not
obtained, An explanation of the SCR data with respect to uncertainty reductiOn
cao account for all findings, whereas a "reiative frequency" explanation cao deal
with only a part of the data. Therefore the hypothesis that the amount of
uncertainty reduction during the cognitive process of testing hypotheses bas an
analogue at the neural level seems most likely.
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